A general framework for robust watermarking security by Barni, Mauro et al.
A general framework for robust watermarking security
Mauro Barni, Franco Bartolini, Teddy Furon
To cite this version:
Mauro Barni, Franco Bartolini, Teddy Furon. A general framework for robust watermarking
security. Signal Processing, Elsevier, 2003, 83 (10), pp.2069-2084. <inria-00080835>
HAL Id: inria-00080835
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00080835
Submitted on 6 Jul 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
A general framework for robust watermarking
security
Mauro Barni a, Franco Bartolini b,2, and Teddy Furon c
a Department of Information Engineering, University of Siena
Via Roma, 56 - 53100 Siena, Italy
e-mail: barni@dii.unisi.it
b Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, University of Florence
Via di S. Marta, 3 - 50139 Firenze, Italy
e-mail: barto@lci.det.unifi.it
c TEMICS project, IRISA/INRIA
Campus de Beaulieu, 35000 Rennes, France
e-mail: teddy.furon@irisa.fr
Abstract
The analysis of the security of watermarking algorithms has received increasing
attention since it has been recognized that the sole investigation of robustness issues
is not enough to properly address the challenges set by practical applications. Such
a security analysis, though, is still in its infancy, up to a point that a general
agreement has not yet been reached even on the most fundamental problems. The
purpose of this paper is to provide a general security framework encompassing most
of the problems encountered in real-world applications. By considering the amount
of information the attacker has about the watermarking algorithm, we introduce the
notion of fair and un-fair attacks, so to ease the classification of different systems
and attacks. Though we recognize that many important differences exist between
watermarking and cryptographic security, a large part of our work is inspired by the
Diffie-Helmann’s paradigm, which is widely used in cryptography. For each class of
systems great care is taken to describe both the attacker’s and watermarker’s point
of view, presenting the challenges raised by each system to these different actors.
Finally, we try to outline some research directions which, according to us, deserve
further analysis.
Key words: Digital watermarking, watermarking attacks, watermarking security,
fair and unfair attacks, Diffie-Hellmann’s attacks classification.
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1 Introduction
Although most of watermarking research has focused on robustness, capac-
ity, and perceptibility issues, it has been recently acknowledged that security
aspects are also (if not even more) important for many secure applications
such as copy control [1,2], ownership verification [?], and authentication [?].
Recognizing that the development of secure robust watermarking schemes,
and even that the exact definition of what security means in a watermarking
context, is still in its infancy, it is the objective of this paper to survey the
most important problems that have been raised, as well as the solutions that
have been proposed so far with regard to this topic in the literature.
1.1 Watermarking is an application driven solution
The importance of the security aspects of a watermarking technique is highly
related to the application the technique has been devised to serve. There are
applications for which security does not constitute a problem (e.g. document
labelling, content enhancement), and among the applications for which se-
curity is an issue, different levels of safety can be identified (e.g. in DRM 3
mechanisms, while the CPTWG 4 looked for a watermarking technique that,
by making hacking slightly difficult, would only help ’keep honest people hon-
est’, at the same time, the SDMI 5 was aiming at a hacker-proof watermarking
solution [4]).
Another caveat is the fact that each application uses watermarking for a par-
ticular purpose and in a specific framework. A common mistake is a misun-
derstanding of the functionality offered by a watermarking technique. Water-
marking is widely but wrongly believed to be the art of hiding owners’ name in
their contents. This is not true. The scope of potential applications is broader
than copyright protection and proof of ownership. On the other hand, focusing
on this latter application, watermarking may not be the solution. The owner
may not be the only one to embed data within his works; usurpers also build
their own private channel. As it is, watermarking doesn’t provide the owner
a solution to copyright struggles [5]. This lack of understanding stems from
the fact that, from a security point of view, watermarking is, at best, just a
security brick. Computer Security people usually name this a primitive. This
element is useless on its own unless included in a global system: that is a
structured set of primitives providing a solution to a certain problem. It turns
out that security analysis is then, above all, application driven. There is also
3 Digital Rights Management
4 Copy Protection Technical Working Group [3]
5 Secure Digital Music Initiative
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a wide range of working frameworks. For instance, it is different the case of
copy control mechanisms, where the detector has to be considered to as public
[1,2] (i.e. a system embedded in consumer electronic devices), and ownership
verification systems, where the detector is private [6](i.e. used by a trusted
person).
Due to its versatility of use in functionality and framework, it seems that each
watermarking application should require a dedicated security analysis. In this
paper, we make an effort to decouple the application impacts presenting a
methodology to generally tackle security analysis. Hence, we do not refer to
any particular application, but when relevant, anyway, related applications
illustrate the considered situation.
1.2 Definition of security of robust watermarking
Security of watermarking based applications can be obviously faced at a proto-
col level, for example by integrating watermarking systems with cryptographic
techniques [7]: we do not deal with this kind of solutions, because, although
very important and effective, they do not regard watermarking technology
only. Our attention is thus solely concentrated on the signal processing as-
pects of watermarking security.
In particular, we focus on robust watermarking. In this context, a water-
marking algorithm aims at mixing a non-perceptible communication channel
with multimedia data, in such a way that the capacity of this extra channel
degrades smoothly with the distortion the watermarked content undergoes
[8]. The smoother the capacity function versus the distortion due to content
manipulations, the more robust the watermarking technique. Then, robust
watermark security refers to the inability by unauthorized users to access the
extra channel. It ensures adversaries can not emit or decode hidden bits, and
destroy this channel. As we can assume that the first two threats are satis-
factorily addressed by cryptographic primitives, the main concern is the fact
that, by exploiting the knowledge of the particular system or keys used to wa-
termark the content 6 , the adversary can degrade the channel capacity much
more efficiently than robustness analysis could let imagine [8,9].
6 Such an information may be publicly available at the attacker, or may be acquired
through particular attacks aimed at getting such a, supposedly secret, information.
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1.3 Relationship with cryptography
Although watermarking pertains to signal processing, it is also related to com-
puter security, whence, the comparison with cryptography must be properly
treated. There are many differences between cryptography and robust wa-
termarking techniques, beginning from the very objective of each technology.
While in the first case, as far as encryption is concerned, the goal is to make
the semantic of a communication not understandable from a possible oppo-
nent assuming that no deterioration of the message carrier happens, in the
latter case the aim is to protect the hidden communication itself from possible
deterioration of the channel (i.e. of the cover data). Anyway, an investigation
on how evaluation of cryptographic algorithms is proceeded is compelling [10].
We borrow that approach for understanding the security issues of the robust
watermarking tool. In particular, as it is done for cryptography since Diffie
and Hellmann’s article [11], the security analysis is driven by the data the op-
ponent observes once the embedder starts producing watermarked contents.
Only watermarked content. The attacker can only have access to one or
more watermarked documents.
Chosen watermarked content. The attacker can choose one or more (pre-
tended) watermarked documents.
Original and watermarked pair. The attacker can have access to one or
more pairs of original and corresponding watermarked documents.
Chosen original and watermarked pair. The attacker can choose one or
more pairs of original and corresponding watermarked documents.
The first attack is the most important as every watermarking system has
obviously to deal with it. The second one is mainly related to the possibility for
the attacker to have access to the decoding process. He observes the outputs of
the detector for some selected documents. The third case reflects the possibility
to have original documents available to the adversary. The fourth attack can
be implemented if the watermark embedding system is available to the pirate,
so that he can generate original and watermarked pairs. In the second and
fourth cases, it is assumed that the pirate has not access to the embedding or
decoding key: either the device is left unarmed without the secret key, or this
key is hard wired in the device considered then as a black sealed box.
The main advantage of this classification is that it decouples analysis from
the application. Theoretical research on watermarking proves evaluation of the
security level of a technique for each class of attacks. There are techniques more
secure than others for a given class of attacks, but weaker for another class.
Once an application is targeted, a practical watermarking designer analyzes
which type of attack is a real threat in this particular framework. There exist
indeed very few applications where the four classes of observations are available
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to the pirate. Then, the designer selects the technique, which is the most robust
and secure to these potential threats.
1.4 Notations
For our purposes, the following notations are introduced. We denote an original
content, its watermarked version and its watermarked and attacked version by
co, cw, and ca. The embedding function Emb(.) receives four arguments: the
algorithm a, the message to be hidden m, the embedding key kE and the
original content co, and produces the watermarked content cw:
cw = Emb(co, a,m, kE) (1)
The watermark embedding algorithm is modelled as a three step process.
First N features are extracted from the document and stored in a feature
vector ~fo = Ext(co, a). The watermarked feature vector is the mixing of the
original feature vector with the watermark signal ~w: ~fw = Mix(~fo, ~w). Note
that ~w may depend on ~fo if the informed embedding approach is used [12].
Finally, these modified features are mapped back in the original document:
cw = Ext
−1(~fw, co, a). The watermark signal hasN samples, which are function
of the embedding key and the message to be hidden: ~w = Gen(m, kE, a).
In the same way, the decoding function Dec(.) yields a message from a received
content as follows:
mˆ = Dec(c, a, kD). (2)
A distinction is needed between the decoding of a hidden message and the
detection of a watermark signal. In the first case, m belongs to a message
space M = {1, . . . , 2C}, where C is the capacity in bits. In the latter case,
m ∈ {0, 1} where m = 0 (m = 1) is not a symbol to be hidden but it
reflects the fact that the content has not been watermarked (resp. it has been
watermarked).
Finally, {A,Co,M,KE, KD} are random variables, whereas {a, co,m, kE, kD}
denotes one instanciation of these random variables.
The observations made by the opponent since the embedder started to produce
watermarked contents, are denoted by O. More explicitly, for the four classes
mentioned previously, we have:
Only watermarked content. O = {cw,i}i∈IO.
Chosen watermarked content. O = {cw,i, mˆi}i∈IC.
Original and watermarked pair. O = {cw,i, co,i}i∈IO.
Chosen original and watermarked pair. O = {cw,i, co,i}i∈IC.
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IO represents a random set of content’s indices, whereas IC is the set of the
indices of the contents chosen on purpose by the opponent.
This classification certainly needs some refinements to encompass all the types
of attacks. For instance, for the only watermarked content attack, the obser-
vations can be O = {cw,i = Emb(co,i, a,m, kE)}, i.e. a set of different contents
watermarked with the same algorithm, the same embedding key and the same
message. This is quite usual in copy protection application [13] or when a fixed
template is added to help synchronization [14]. In the case of a linear embed-
ding process, the average attack might give out an accurate estimation of the
watermark signal. But, this type of attack also pertains to the case where
O = {cw,i = Emb(co, a,mi, kE)}. This is typical from the tracing application,
where a fingerprint is inserted in the distributed copies of a work. Then, the
collusion attack is a real threat, yielding an unwatermarked copy of the work
[15–17].
1.5 Structure of the paper
In this paper we propose a new framework to understand watermarking secu-
rity: this is based mainly on modelling the watermark as a game with some
rules (consisting of the respect of the established secret parameters), and on
classifying the attacks as fair, if they obey the rules (i.e. based solely on what
is known), or unfair, if they attempt to break the rules (i.e. if they attempt
to discover the parameters that the embedder intended to keep secret). The
different watermarking approaches will thus be analyzed on the basis of this
approach, the security problems and how they can be faced with will be dis-
cussed, and the raising challenges pointed out.
The paper is organized as it follows. In section 2 the concept of fair and unfair
attacks is introduced and the general framework we will use to analyze water-
marking security introduced. In section 3, the classical security-by-obscurity
scheme in which security is achieved by keeping all the details of the wa-
termarking algorithm secret is discussed. In section 4, it is assumed that the
watermarking algorithm is disclosed, thus letting security rely on the secrecy of
the watermarking embedding and decoding keys. The asymmetric watermark-
ing scenario is analyzed in section 5, where the challenges and opportunities
set by public-key watermarking are reviewed. The possibility of developing a
system in which the attacker knows all the details of the watermarking algo-
rithm is investigated in section 6. The paper ends with some conclusions and
suggestions for future research on the topic in section 7.
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2 The framework
In the attempt to shed some light about the possible approaches to design
a secure watermarking system, and to classify them in a way which is as
consistent as possible, we focus on the a priori information the pirate is allowed
to resort to. According to the, so to say, normal course of the game, such an
information is limited by the rule of the game. For instance, we can assume
either that the algorithms used to embed and retrieve the watermark is known
to the attacker, or that such an information is not available. Let us now
assume that the attacker, however ill-intentioned he may be, is a fair player,
and as such he obeys the rules of the game. In this case, he tries to make
the watermark unreadable being satisfied with the information the rule of
the game assigns to him and the observations O available once the game
started. If he is supposed not to know the watermarking algorithm, he operates
blindly, whereas if the game rules allow him to access such an information,
he tries to design an attack by explicitly exploiting the weaknesses of the
particular algorithm used by the owner. In the following, we refer to this kind
of attacks, in which the attacker only exploits publicly available information,
as fair attacks.
Of course, the scenario depicted above is an unrealistic one. In real applica-
tions, attackers are obviously not fair, thus they try to access all the infor-
mation which may be of any help for their goal. For instance, thanks to the
observations, they will try to know how the watermarking system works, or
to discover the secret keys used for watermark embedding or decoding, even if
the rules of the game assume that this is a secret information. From a security
point of view, then, it is essential that the watermarker takes care of keeping
the secret information secret. This may be a very difficult task, possibly much
more difficult than achieving security against fair attacks. It is, then, the self-
interest of the watermarker to minimize the information to be kept secret. Of
course, as system secretness decreases, the rules of the game tend to favor the
attacker, hence making more and more difficult coping with fair attacks. The
necessity that the watermarker carefully considers which kind of information
is to be kept secret and which information is made publicly available is sum-
marized in figure 1, where the effort to cope with fair attacks and the effort
to ensure the secretness of secret information are qualitatively plotted against
the amount of to-be-kept-secret information. As it can be seen, the need for a
trade-off between security-by-obscurity (right end of the plot) and open-cards
watermarking (left end of the plot), readily comes out.
With these remarks in mind, we classify watermarking security analysis ac-
cording to the a priori information R which is made publicly available to the
attacker. More specifically, we consider four scenarios:
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Effort to
cope with
attacks
To-be-kept-secret information
fair
attacks
unfair
attacks
Fig. 1. The security tradeoff. As the amount of to-be-kept-secret information in-
creases, the effort to cope with unfair attacks increases and that to cope with fair
attacks diminishes.
No knowledge : R = ∅,
Knowledge of the embedding and detection algorithms : R = {a},
Knowledge of the detection key : R = {a, kD},
Knowledge of the detection and the embedding keys :R = {a, kD, kE}.
Note that we explicitly make provision for asymmetric watermarking schemes,
where the embedder and the detector use a different key to perform their
tasks. On the contrary, non-disclosed information, which is to be kept secret,
is denoted by S. It follows that S = {a, kD, kE} − R. The game is a steady
one i.e. the opponent is constrained to remain fair, if the information leakage
concerning the secrets is small. Mathematically, it should be proven that:
I(O;S|R) ∼ 0 (3)
where I(O;S|R) is the mutual information between the observations and the
secret information subject to the a priori knowledge the game assigns to the
attacker. This quantity is important as it measures how the ignorance of the
opponent about the secret decreases due to (or thanks to, according to the
point of view) the observations. C.E. Shannon named this ignorance the equiv-
ocation [18]. It is given by :
H(S|O,R) = H(S|R)− I(O;S|R) ≥ 0 (4)
When the equivocation equals zero, the opponent has gathered enough ob-
servations to uniquely find the value of S. C.E. Shannon speaks of a unicity
distance [18]. Contrary to cryptography, the opponent of the watermarker usu-
ally does not need the exact value of the secret. If we assume that the secret is
the watermark signal added to a content, a good estimation is usually sufficient
to remove most of the watermark energy. For correlation-based detectors, even
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Table 1
A framework for watermark security analysis. Each row differs according to the
information the pirate has access to.
A priori infor-
mation
Pro’s & Con’s
Scenario a kE kD Pirate’s view Owner’s view
Security by
obscurity
no no no Need to focus on
unfair attacks
Too much secret in-
formation
Symmetric
watermarking
yes no no Balance fair and
unfair attacks
Difficulty in keep-
ing kD secret
Asymmetric
watermarking
yes no yes Better focus on fair
attacks
Major threat from
fair attacks
Playing open
cards
yes yes yes Very powerful fair
attacks exist
Nothing but a
dream ?
rough estimation can be used to forge a pirated content: the more accurate is
the estimation, the less distortion is needed to hack the content [19].
When the above point of view is adopted, the classification given in table 1 is
obtained. In the security-by-obscurity scenario, it is assumed that the attacker
knows neither the algorithm used to embed and retrieve the watermark nor the
embedding and detection keys. In such a scenario, the design of an effective fair
attack may result to be a difficult task 7 . Hence it is better for the attacker
to concentrate on un-fair attacks, since it is possible (likely) that some of
the secret information leak out from the system thanks to the observations.
Conversely, the watermarker has to put a significant effort to keep all the
details about his system secret, a task which is extremely demanding.
By passing to the next row of the table, the common situation in which the wa-
termarking algorithm is assumed to be known, but the embedding/detection
keys are kept secret, is encountered. This is the scenario conventional wa-
termarking algorithms refer to. In many applications, though, keeping the
detection key secret may be a risky attempt. This is the case, for example,
with applications where the detector is to be located in consumer electronics
devices, e.g. with copy protection application [1]. Its disclosure is highly likely
if the watermarking decoder is implemented in software on open platform like
PCs [21], and still possible (yet, demanding a high technical level) even if
implemented in hardware.
The difficulties with symmetric watermarking schemes where both the embed-
7 Yet this is exactly what general purpose watermarking removal packages like
Stirmark do [20].
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ding and detection keys are kept secret, aroused the interest in asymmetric
schemes, where the key used to retrieve the watermark is different from (a
subset of) that used to embed it. Of course, in this way the effort necessary to
protect secrets is significantly lower. At the same time, fair attacks represent a
more and more insidious threat, up to a point that concerns exist on whether
robust asymmetric watermarking will ever be possible.
Finally, an open-cards scenario may be conceived of where the attacker can
access all the information he wants about both the embedder and the detector.
Of course, in such a case, the effort put by the watermarker to protect system’s
secrets is minimized, thus forcing the attacker to rely only on fair attacks. On
the other hand, in this case fair attacks may be extremely powerful, thus
making the design of a secure, open-cards, watermarking systems extremely
difficult (maybe impossible).
In the next sections, the four scenarios outlined above are discussed in more
details, by considering both the watermarker’s and attacker’s points of view.
The pro’s and con’s of the different approaches are highlighted and exemplified
by the light of the current state of the art.
3 Security by Obscurity
This section explores the choice of relying on the fact that nothing is known
by the attacker. Herein, nothing means neither the algorithms nor the tuning
parameters are public a priori information.
3.1 The watermarker’s side
This strategy was extremely common at the beginning of the digital water-
marking history. The rationale was that if one cannot see the watermark, if
one cannot fool the detector by any content transformation (because we deal
herein with robust techniques), if one doesn’t know how it is made, then,
watermarking would definitively ensure security. The research efforts then fo-
cused on the robustness requirement, masking the need and even the concept
of security in the watermarking community.
There are two shortcomings in this rationale. The first mistake is a misunder-
standing of the functionality offered by a watermarking technique as already
illustrated in subsection 1.1. The second mistake is the belief that a piece of
information can remain secret, especially since it is an algorithm. There should
be no need to say that if the security-by-obscurity strategy was chosen, then,
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it would be neither possible to patent the watermarking technique nor to pub-
lish technical articles. It usually turns out that one discovers the company
which provides its technique to the global system. The first thing an un-fair
attacker does is to look for any piece of technical information coming from
this company that would give him a clue on the used algorithms. Another
method, which is more common in steganography than in watermarking, is to
build statistical tests to discover what technique is used, e.g. in which domain
the watermark signal has been added. The minimal amount of this a posteri-
ori information that the adversary can gather is given by the instantiation of
Eq. (3) when the secret to be disclosed is the algorithm and the observations
are, at least, the watermarked content: I(A;Cw = Emb(Co, A,M,KE)). This
threat of information leakages concerning the algorithms has really happened
during the SDMI challenge [22]. Our conclusion is that, in watermarking, the
algorithm can not remain secret. Hence, ”obscurity” is not enough to enforce
security against un-fair attackers.
In cryptography, people are more aware about these information leakages.
Even in military applications, the motto is that an algorithm is disclosed
within, on average, two years. In 1883, A. Kerckhoff wrote an article present-
ing the elementary cryptographic rules [23]. His main statement is that the
designer of a cryptographic system must suppose that the adversary knows
his algorithms in details except for a parameter called the secret key. Hence,
the security of the cryptographic system only stems from storing the secret
key in a safe place, the rest of the system being public. Kerckhoff’s principle
is a heuristic defended by two facts: there are proprietary algorithms (i.e.,
violating the Kerckhoff’s principle) that have been hacked. The book of Singh
gives numerous examples from the cryptographic field [24], the most famous
being the hack of the Enigma encryption machine during the Second World
War. Secondly, there are public encryption algorithms that remain unbroken
(e.g. RSA, DES), even if weaknesses have been identified (for instance in key
selection).
Kerckhoff’s principle is more than a heuristic warning about the danger of the
security-by-obscurity. It constitutes the basement of cryptanalysis, and hence
the basement of security analysis of watermarking schemes. To get the basic
idea across, we reflect the underlying concept of security level. This level is
related to the amount of observation, the complexity, the amount of time, or
the work as C.E. Shannon denoted it [18], that the attacker needs to gather
in order to hack a system. What Kerckhoff means is that the watermarker
should be aware of a lower bound of the security level. As the secrecy of an
algorithm can not be fairly weighted, then, we should ignore it in security level
estimations. This does not mean that obscurity is useless, it is just unproven
security.
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3.2 The attacker’s side
Having no clue about the watermarking technique, the fair attacker tries some
content transformations to fool the watermark decoder. This is clearly a matter
of robustness against intentional processing. We only concern ourselves with
two issues in this section. The first one investigates how the pirate proceeds,
the second one explores the risks he takes.
A huge part of the watermarking literature focuses on robustness, develop-
ing attacks and counter-attacks. At the beginning, a lot of research efforts
dealt with compression, filtering or noise addition and, as a counter-measure,
the selection of an embedding domain less sensitive to this transformation.
One main idea is to slightly modify, via the use of a direct sequence spread
spectrum communication scheme, the most perceptibly relevant parts of the
content [25]. Nowadays, geometrical distortions are the main concern. Possible
counter-measures are, for instance: to embed a template, an extra signal used
to synchronize embedder and detector [26]; to embed the watermark signal
in invariant domains [27]; to introduce redundancy in the watermark signal
in order to reduce the space of potential delays; or to use use image self reg-
istration [28]. The watermarking community has also greatly benefited from
some benchmark suites [29–31], entering in a virtuous circle of attacks and
counter-attacks. Finally, the robustness of the watermarking techniques has
been largely improved in the last years. To successfully hack protected con-
tents, the attacker has to distort them down to a very low quality. Even if no
certainty exists, and even if new, more powerful, attacks are invented nearly
daily [32,33], we can realistically think, or simply assume, that in the end ro-
bustness issues will be given a satisfactorily answer, at least in the context of
a given application scenario. This favors the strategy of the un-fair attacker
disclosing the algorithms and the keys of the watermarking technique.
Some watermarkers name these kind of attacks blind attacks. Exploring this
issue in more depth, we argue that this terminology is more appropriate in
characterizing the pirate’s state of mind rather than denoting a particular
class of attacks. The fair attacker is in a blind state as he has no hint about
the success of his attacks until his hacked contents are under the scrutiny of a
watermark decoder. For a given attack, there are three types of watermarking
techniques. The first ones are perfectly robust against this attack, meaning
that their performance (such as the power of the detection test or the prob-
ability of correctly decoding the hidden message) is not affected. The second
class gathers the techniques which are absolutely non-robust against this at-
tack: it nullifies their performance. The last class is in the middle, when the
attack lowers the performance to a given extent. For instance, if the power of
the detection test decreases down to 1/2, the attack succeeds in average on
one out of two contents. Too much papers claim their proposed watermarking
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technique is robust to, for instance, jpeg compression as tested on the ’Lena’
image. But the only relevant experiment, in watermarking detection, is to plot
the power of the test against the quality factor of the compression.
Moreover, the fair attacker in a blind state has no clue about the type of
techniques he faces. For some applications, this is not a matter. For example, in
DVD copy protection, a consumer electronics device has a watermark detector
which prevents from recording protected contents. The pirate can do whatever
experiment secretly and safely at home. In other scenarios, he has no access to
a watermark decoder, and, a failure in the attack is a dead-lock. The cost of a
failure might be prohibitive. This is often the case in the professional domain,
where, once caught, the attacker would be sued and ruined by trials.
To conclude this section, it turns out that security-by-obscurity is not a steady
state of the table 1. The easiest path is to go for an un-fair attack, trying to
jump into the next row of the table. On the other hand, the watermarker
is advised by Kerckhoff’s principle to not to ensure security by relying on
obscurity only.
4 Symmetric watermarking
As we have seen, it is not reasonable to assume that the watermarking algo-
rithm remains unknown; as a first step, thus, we make the hypothesis that
solely the embedding and decoding keys are kept secret. Under such an hy-
pothesis the fair attacks try to remove or make unreadable the watermark
based solely on the a priori information about the embedding and decoding
algorithms, while the unfair try to discover the secret keys, and, based on
this a posteriori information, remove or make unreadable the watermark. The
latter class of attacks is more difficult, but also more effective in achieving its
goal, in the sense that the amount of attack distortion needed is surely lower.
We now analyze which possibilities exist and the challenges that the water-
marker and the pirate must undertake.
4.1 The watermarker’s side
In general, the watermarker worries about two issues. Firstly, he has to select
a watermarking technique which is robust to the content transformations the
attacker may resort to in the current application. We already discussed this
point in subsection 3.2. We would like to insist here on the fact that the sen-
tence ”this technique is robust” does not make sense in general. We believe,
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in fact, that for almost all applications it is possible to find a watermarking
technique which is robust to the content transformations allowed in that par-
ticular context. For instance, in video watermarking, a rotation of the frames
of more than few degrees is a moot attack: will people accept to turn their
head to watch these hacked movies?
This argument must be tempered with the following fact. Knowing the algo-
rithm, the pirate can resort to more powerful attacks, since he is able to play
in the embedding domain. In other words, he has access to feature vectors ~f
because the extraction function is now public. More sophisticated attacks than
classical content transformations rely on noise removal filtering, in particular if
suitable statistical models of the original features and of the watermark signal
are available. For example, S.Voloshynovskiy and al. developed a watermark
removal filter based on Maximum Likelihood or Maximum A Posteriori prob-
ability criteria [34]. In practice, the pirate looks for the best approximation
of the original document, by assuming that the watermark can be viewed as
disturbing noise. Similarly, Wiener filtering can be adopted to try to separate
the watermark and the host document. The theoretical issue behind this is
whether a perfect mixing Mix(.) of the original features and the watermark
signal is possible [9].
A possible countermeasure, suggested by J. Su and al. is to follow the Power
Spectrum Condition [35] stating that the power spectrum density of the wa-
termark should be shaped like the one of the feature vector: S~w ∝ S~fo . Another
possibility, proposed by Le Guelvouit and al., is to embed the watermark sig-
nal and then to self attack the resulting signals ~fw by a Wiener filtering [36].
This highly diminishes the efficiency of watermark removal filters.
Additionally, for watermarking systems implemented in public consumer elec-
tronics devices, the watermarker must ensure that these devices can not be
forced. If there is no place where the keys are stored safely, then, security
is impossible with the rule of this section. This precaution has a price: soft-
ware for PC is non-secure but cheap compared to expensive secure processing
units for smart cards. Secure implementation of security primitives is a real
art which is out the of scope of this article.
4.2 The attacker’s side
In this scenario, the attacker is not blind. Because we assume robust water-
marking, he knows that the watermarker did a great job: the hack of protected
contents at a distortion below a perceptual bound (this one depends on the
application) is hard to find. This certainly ruins his business plan as nobody
is interested in such heavily distorted hacked contents.
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His strategy is to refuse the rule of the game. The disclosure of the secret keys
is the mean to forge pirated contents at a low quality loss. To get the basic
idea across, the key will allow him to decode the hidden message. Having in his
hands the key, the data to be embedded and the watermarked content, which
is a close version of the original content, the synthesis of the watermark signal
and its subtraction from the watermarked content are considerably easier. For
example, with classical spread spectrum watermarking the attacker may act
as follows:
cp = cw − (Emb(cw, a, mˆ, kE)− cw) ∼ co, (5)
where cp is the pirated content. Note that such a simple attack does not work
with quantization index modulation schemes, since in that case the embedded
signal depends on the host signal, in such a way that Emb(cw, a, mˆ, kE) = cw.
However, a similar algorithm for quantization index modulation schemes has
also been developed [37].
As the estimation of the secrets is based on the observations, the four types
of attacks of subsection 1.3 are now toured. From now on, the attacks are
two-step processes:
(1) Learning phase: Observe O to gain knowledge from them.
(2) Practice phase: Use this knowledge to hack the targeted contents.
4.2.1 Only watermarked content type
In this scenario, the information leakage is measured by Eq. (6). In this case:
I({~Fw,i};KE|A) = I({Emb(~Fo,i,Mi, KE)};KE) (6)
where conditioning to A has been removed for simplicity in the mutual in-
formation. Feature vectors replaced contents because the opponent has access
to the embedding domain. {~Fo,i,Mi} are sources of entropy, whereas KE has
been fixed by the watermarker before the beginning of the game (still denoted
in capitals as the mutual information is an integral over the set of keys).
As an illustration, we take the very much simple case where Mi = 1,∀i ∈ I,
and algorithm a is a Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DS-SS) based water-
marking technique. There is, then, a bijection between kE and ~w. Indeed, the
pirate is usually more interested in ~w than in kE, if his goal is to forge un-
watermarked contents. With the simple assumption that ~Fo and ~W represent
independent gaussian random vectors whose covariance matrices are Ro and
Rw, then, the leakage of information from one observed watermarked content
equals:
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I(Emb(~Fo, 1, ~W ); ~W )=H(~Fw)−H(~Fw| ~W ) (7)
=H(~Fw)−H(~Fw − ~W | ~W ) (8)
=H(~Fw)−H(~Fo) = 1
2
log
(
1 +
detRw
detRo
)
(9)
This quantity is minimized for Rw = PRo/σ
2
o , P being the power of the
watermark vector. In other words, the Power Spectrum Condition minimizes
the information leakage.
Under this condition, the work of the adversary in order to have an accurate
estimation of ~w is to gather and average O(σ2o/P ) watermarked contents (we
assume these represent independent signals). Note that this averaging process
can be done with raw contents, but it achieves higher efficiency when done on
feature vectors, especially if signal estimation is used as detailed in section 4.1
[10].
Things are more complex as message entropy gets higher. The watermark sig-
nal then depends on kE but also on random variable M , via the modulation
scheme Gen(.). But, it should be still possible to estimate the subspace where
the watermark signal spans. This is especially true when a spread transform
is used to increase the watermark signal to noise ratio. The message is hidden
modifying the projection of vector ~Fo onto several secret carriers {~pk}k∈L.
Hence, vector ~W lives in the small |L|-dimension subspace Vect({~pk}k∈L)
whereas vectors ~Fo span over RN . As far as we are concerned, we do not
know any research work on this subject.
The only-watermarked-content-type also encloses the very special case of the
tracing application by fingerprinting where O = {~fw,i = Emb(~fo,mi, kE)}.
The average attack is then called a collusion (a term from the cryptography
community). Its goal is not to discover secrets but to directly produce an
un-traceable content cˆo. Anti-collusion codes [15–17] have been devised as a
counter-measure. The basic idea behind them is that different codes should
have at least a part in common: it should not be always the same part, but
given any subset of the whole set of codes, the codes belonging to the subset
should have a common part. When some watermarked feature vectors are
averaged, the common parts of the codes do not reduce their strength, thus
making possible to at least identify a subset of the colluders.
Things are much more complex when an informed embedding approach is used,
since in this case the watermark signal depends on two sources of entropy M
and ~Fo.
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4.2.2 Chosen watermarked content type
In this case, the opponent is assumed to have access to a watermark decoder.
A possibility is to iteratively modify the document until the decoder is no
longer able to recover the watermark. This fair approach has a strong limita-
tion, in that, being the modifications performed almost randomly, the time to
find a successful hack for one content within a low quality loss is not determin-
istic and, possibly, very high. The unfair version has been, on the contrary,
demonstrated to be very effective [38] with the so called sensitivity attack.
The learning phase results in the estimation of the boundary of the decision
region, i.e. the locus separating the region of feature vectors considered as wa-
termarked by the decoder, and the region that, on the contrary, is considered
as non-watermarked. In the practice phase, removal is easily performed by
looking for the boundary point which is nearest to the watermarked content
(closest point attack [39]).
In the learning phase, the boundary is estimated as follows: starting from the
watermarked features ~fw,i, they are iteratively modified until the watermark
presence is no longer detected. For instance, knowing that the null vector
belongs to the non-watermarked region, the opponent is sure to find such a a
feature point ~fB,i near to the boundary in iteratively reducing the energy of
~fw,i.
This feature point is now corrupted by adding random vectors ~nj, and the
response of the detector measured for each corrupted vector ~fB,i + ~nj. This
leads to the estimation of the local orthogonal vector ~u⊥i of the boundary. T.
Kalker has proven that [38]:
I(~U⊥i ; {Mˆi,j, ~FB,i + ~Nj}j∈JC) ∝ |J C| for |J C|  N (10)
The ignorance of the opponent about the value ~u⊥i decreases linearly with the
figure of trials, at least at the beginning of the experiment. It is clear that
as the equivocation of Eq. (4) goes to zero, the number of observations in-
creasing, the mutual information tends to zero. No law has been shown for
|J C| . N up to now. Moreover, if we assume that the sign of the components
of vector ~u⊥i yields enough information to the hacker, then, the equivocation
starts at H(sign(~u⊥i )) = N in bits. An estimation of sign(~u
⊥
i ) requires then
O(N) decodings, as shown in figure 2. For a correlation based detector using
a fixed threshold as in DS-SS schemes, the boundary is an hyperplane and the
orthogonal direction at any point allows to recover the whole boundary. The
security level of this scheme against a chosen watermarked content attack is
at most O(N). For more complex detection regions, the orthogonal direction
only gives information about the locally tangent hyperplane at location ~fB,i.
The same estimation should then be repeated for other boundary points. Usu-
ally, the boundary is a parametric surface, so that a finite figure of tangent
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Equivocation
H(sign(U))=N
y=H(sign(U)|Ox)
y=N-l.x
(T.Kalker)
xud=N/l
unicity distance
Number of decodings trials
Fig. 2. Graph of the equivocation against the number of decoding trials.
Original boundary
Fractal boundary
UnDetection Region
Detection Region
Fig. 3. Example of a not parameterizable boundary in the feature space.
hyperplanes is enough to estimate these parameters. It has been proven that
N boundary points are necessary to estimate the parameters of schemes using
second order statisitc based detector (e.g. asymmetric schemes [40] and JANIS
[41]). Then, the security level is in the order of O(N2) decoder trials.
A ultimate countermeasure against the sensitivity attack has been recently
proposed [42]. The success of the sensitivity attack is due to the fact that the
boundary is a parametric curve. The idea in this case is to modify the detection
boundary in such a way to make it not parameterizable by using a fractal
curve. This solution is illustrated in Figure 3, where the original boundary,
here a simple hyperplane (dotted line), is modified to become a Peano curve.
There is no way to find locally tangent hyerplane based solely on the detector
response. The embedding procedure should be, of course, also modified, to be
sure that the watermarked document actually lies in the detection region.
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4.2.3 Original and watermarked pairs type
The case of having, at the attacker disposal, original and watermarked contents
pairs (either chosen or not) is straightforward both in the case of fair and
unfair attacks. The fair attack has not even sense, given that the original
unwatermarked content is available. The unfair one can be easily implemented
by comparing a pair of documents and inverting the embedding rule (which
is known) in such a way to recover the embedded watermark signal. The
mixing function can be broken, and ~w estimated almost perfectly. In the simple
example described in subsection 4.2.1, one pair of contents is enough to disclose
the secret signal.
There are two possible countermeasures against pair attacks. The first one
makes the watermarking signal strongly content-dependent, so that, once re-
covered, the watermark can not be used for removing it from (or adding it to)
other documents. In this framework, a possibility consists in making ~w depen-
dent, further than on the secret and a message, on a robust hash value of the
content [43]. With such an approach, the design of the hashing function may
be very difficult, given that it should be robust (i.e. should produce the same
value with moderately modified copies of the document) and theoretically dif-
ficult to invert. Another option uses side informed watermark embedding so
that, by nature, ~w = Gen(~fo,m, kE) [37,41]. The security level is not a priori
increased because these functions are mainly designed to improve capacity
or probability of good detection, and not to provide security. For the JANIS
scheme with a second order detector, and mi = 1,∀i ∈ IO, the security level
is upper bounded by O(N) pairs of independent vectors [10].
A second countermeasure randomizes the watermark signal: ~w = Gen(m, r, kE)
where r is a random value changing at each embedding [40]. The security level
is then upper-bounded by O(|KE|) tries of keys, i.e. the complexity of a brute
force attack for schemes where mi = 1, ∀i ∈ IO.
4.3 Conclusion concerning this case
When compared to the ”security by obscurity” scenario, the analysis developed
in this section, represents a dramatic improvement, since it is now possible
to quantify the security level of a given watermarking system. The use of
information theory to quantify information leakages is not new in security. It
dates back to Shannon’s cryptographic article [18]. Its use in data hiding is
very rare with known exceptions [44,45,10].
Note that the secrecy of the key has been analyzed herein, but the oppo-
nent might be interested in reading (or writing) hidden messages, rather than
disclosing the key. In other words, the opponent seeks to obliterate the wa-
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termarking channel (which resembles the physical layer of a communication
system) in our analysis, but other threats are the unauthorized access to this
channel. Encryption of the hidden messages prevents from disclosing their
semantic sense if the opponent succeeds to decode the hidden bits. Digital
signature of the hidden messages prevents from usurping the right to write
onto this channel. Of course, these tools do not protect the sustaining of the
watermark signal. Furthermore, the use of these cryptographic primitives on
top of the robust watermarking channel may not be possible as its capacity is
usually very low. To give an order of magnitude, texts are usually encrypted
by blocks of 128 bits (AES) or 1024 bits (RSA), and the recommended sizes of
digital signatures are 1024 bits (DSA) or 320 bits (elliptic curves signatures).
As an alternative, signal processing tools might provide these primitives. The
invention of a modulation scheme such as I( ~W = Gen(M,KE);M) = 0 is a
real challenge. A very good paper with respect to this subject, which is also,
with Cachin’s article [44], the pioneer work about security of watermarking,
was written by T. Mittelholzer in 1999 [45].
5 Asymmetric watermarking: towards public key detection
In this section, algorithm a and detection key kD are public data. Before
analyzing this rule, the need of public key detection is justified. In copyright
protection, the decoding of a watermark in a work might bring a proof of own-
ership to a doubtful person. It implies that this a priori non-trusted person has
access to the decoder, and he could steal the decoding key. Protocols mixing
zero-knowledge disclosure cryptography and watermarking are very promis-
ing [7]. But, they need a bidirectional communication between the prover and
the verifier. In copy protection, the decoder embedded in consumer electron-
ics devices is also in a hostile environment, and a bi-directional link between
the producer stage and the device may be difficult or just impossible to es-
tablish. The idea of a public detection key is very compelling because secure
electronic chips are very expensive. Security, then, resides only on the secrecy
of the embedding key.
This concept is quite astonishing, but it is a reality in cryptography. Digital
signatures are based on asymmetry: a verifier checks with the related public
key what have been signed by a private key. Is this possible in watermarking?
As far as the authors know, the answer can not yet be given. By following the
analogy with cryptography, the embedding and the detection processes must
be made asymmetric, in relying on different keys (or sets of parameters). This
is why public-detection watermarking is usually referred to as asymmetric
watermarking. However, as we will see below, key asymmetry is by no means
sufficient to provide security in a public-detection environment. At least, the
watermarker must have a proof that the knowledge of the detection key does
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not bring a full or partial a priori information about the embedding key.
5.1 The attacker’s side
In order to illustrate why key asymmetry does not always help the design of
a public-detection watermarking scheme, let us consider the example of the
randomized embedding process described in section 4.2. Denote k′E = {kE, r}.
The watermarking system with keys k′E and kD is asymmetric as r is a random
only known at the embedding side. Thus, knowing kD, there is no way to
disclose k′E. Yet, asymmetry does not imply robust public key watermarking.
All known asymmetric schemes are hacked so far when kD is public
8 : paper
[46] explains an attack valid for almost all known asymmetric schemes. In other
words, whereas asymmetry is certainly helpful, it is far from being sufficient
to ensure security in a public detection scenario.
5.2 The watermarker’s side
The reason why asymmetric schemes are not (up to now) secure public key
detection methods is the following. The knowledge of the algorithm and the
detection key implies the knowledge of the boundary of the detection region.
The closest point attack is then a deadlock. Will there be a solution?
Here are some hand-waving justifications about a theoretical watermarking
detection avoiding this pitfall. The detection process must be an algorithm
which is a binary test: Dec(.) : RN → {0, 1}. It is an indicator function of
the detection region. But, it must not reveal the boundary of this region to
prevent the closest point attack. Does this kind of mathematical function ex-
ist? Fractal functions pertain to this principle. We do not know how to build a
watermarking scheme from this type of functions, but, at least a mathematical
tool yields the good property required for public key detection watermarking.
Such a detection process does not need to be private. The pirate must test
every point of the space in order to disclose the boundary. The watermarker
wins the game if this brute force attack lasts an exponential (with respect to
N) amount of time. This is seemingly possible: imagine the pirate quantizes
the real axis into B bins, then the map of RN is a grid containing BN points to
be tested. The watermark must prove that there is no other way to disclose the
boundary. The next issue is how the knowledge of the embedding key allows
him to watermark contents in a polynomial amount of time.
8 Yet, they are not useless, because they provide higher security levels than classical
schemes when the detection key is secret as already mentioned in 4.2.
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6 Playing open cards
The path followed in the previous sections has been one of progressively di-
minishing the information the owner must keep secret. In this way the effort
needed to face with unfair attacks diminishes, while leaving the owner’s side
open to more and more powerful fair attacks. When brought to its extreme
consequences, this process leads to a situation in which the attacker can access
all the information he desires, i.e. he knows the watermarking algorithm, as
well as both the embedding and detection keys used by the system. In this sec-
tion, we briefly review the challenges set to the watermarker and the attacker
by this, so to say, open cards scenario.
6.1 Watermarker’s side
It is obvious that the open cards scenario is the most favorable one from the
point of view of unfair attacks. According to our scheme, in fact, no care
has to be taken to keep information secret, simply because the watermarking
algorithm assumes that the attacker can obtain all the information he desires.
This may also be considered as a pessimistic scenario where the watermarker
assumes that no defense is possible against unfair attacks, since, in the end,
the attacker will also manage to unreveal the watermarker’s secrets. Playing
an open cards game is a possibility to get around the problem. An obvious
question is whether in this case robustness against fair attacks is possible.
In order to get more insight into the security problems set by the open cards
scenario, let us consider in more details the reasons that led us to consider
asymmetric watermarking schemes. As we have seen in subsection 4.2, one of
the most powerful attacks that can be conceived against virtually any water-
marking scheme is the closest point attack. In its fair version, such an attack
assume that the attacker knows the boundary of the detection region, and
hence can make the watermark unreadable by simply moving the host data
to the closest point of the non-detection region. The unfair version of the
closest-point attack only differs from the fair version, in that the boundary
of the detection region is estimated by the attacker through a trial and error
procedure. The reason why asymmetric watermarking schemes may provide a
solution to the closest point attack can be explained as follows. Let us assume
that the detection region is described in such a complicated way that moving
a point inside and outside it, while matching the invisibility constraint, is a
computationally unfeasible operation. This may be the case, for example, with
the boundary depicted in figure 3. Knowing the detection boundary now does
not help the attacker in any way. Unfortunately, having such a complicated
detection region also makes watermark embedding a very difficult task. Asym-
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Boundary description
at the detector
Boundary description
at the embedder
Fig. 4. Asymmetric watermarking. A simplified description of the detection region
is available at the embedder.
metric watermarking may help in solving this apparent deadlock by letting the
embedder know an alternative, hopefully simpler, description of the detection
region. With such a description in his hands, the embedder can easily move
any point in the host feature space inside the detection region, while, at the
same time, satisfying the invisibility constraint. Such a situation is exempli-
fied in figure 4, where the complex detection region boundary available at the
detector is depicted together with a smoother boundary used by the embed-
der to watermark the to-be-protected content. According to this scenario, the
necessary asymmetry between watermark embedding and watermark removal
(respectively corresponding to entering and exiting the detection region) is ob-
tained by assigning the embedder and the detector (and hence the attacker)
a different description of the detection region, i.e. a different key. One may
wonder whether such an asymmetry may be obtained directly by properly
designing the detection region. In other words, would it be possible to design
the detection region in such a way that it is easy to move a point inside it,
but very difficult to bring a point outside it, by matching, at the same, the
imperceptibility constraint ? If this is possible, there is no need to distinguish
between the embedding and detection keys, and to keep any of these keys
secret: the watermarker can play open cards.
No answer has been given to the above questions so far, even if the design
of a detection region such as the one described above immediately appears
to be a very difficult task. However, until an explicit proof that a detection
region with these characteristics can not be built, the possibility of developing
a secure watermarking system following the open card approach can not be
ignored. A more detailed discussion of the open cards approach, can be found
in [39], along with some hints on how an asymmetric detection region could
be built .
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6.2 Pirate’s side
From the pirate’s point of view, the open-cards scenario may be a favorable
one, since in this case very powerful fair attacks can be conceived of. However,
if the possibility of building an intrinsically asymmetric detection region with
the characteristics described in the previous section is proved, the pirate’s task
becomes hopeless, since no further possibility exists for him to resort to unfair
attacks.
7 Conclusion
Aiming at discussing watermarking security from as wider a perspective as
possible, we introduced a framework in which each watermarking system is
classified according to the knowledge in the hands of a possible attacker. In
order to further clarify the nature of such a knowledge, we introduced the
concept of fair and unfair attacks. In this way we managed to distinguish
between the information which is publicly available to the pirate and that
gained by the pirate through a set of attacks, expressly designed to disclose
watermarker’s secrets.
With this general formulation in mind, we selected the four scenarios sum-
marized in table 1. Whereas it is widely agreed that system designers should
not resort to the security-by-obscurity scenario, and the open-cards approach
may seem to be unrealistic, the choice between symmetric and asymmetric
watermarking is still a current research issue.
As a second contribution, we described a mathematical framework, inspired
by information theory principles, whereby the security of any watermarking
algorithm with respect to unfair attacks can be quantified. This represents a
significant improvement with respect to the current state of the art, according
to which security is often treated at a very empirical level.
As a final remark, we would like to stress out that, whereas cryptographic-like
security may be out-of-reach for watermarking systems, and maybe not even
required in most cases, it is still important that a significant effort is made in
order to, at least, define and quantify watermarking security in a precise and
solid mathematical sense.
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